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Abstract
This Essay addresses one of the main issues currently facing the European Community, the
problem of discrimination between individuals. Because discrimination on the basis of nationality
concerns virtually everybody, this is a sensitive and universal concern. In addition, this Essay ex-
amines an area of law in which the applicable law hinges upon the distinction between the terms
“at home” and “abroad.” I use the expression distinction because not every distinction results in
discrimination. Discrimination occurs when a distinction is made between people in comparable
situations without sufficient justification. . . . In the Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. Roland Schumacker
decision and succeeding cases, the Court has attempted to consider international tax law by con-
firming, for the first time, the distinction between residents and non-residents as it is recognized in
tax law. To do justice to the special features of this case and the legal reasoning it introduces, it is
necessary first to consider the situation prevailing before the Schumacker judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses one of the main issues currently facing
the European Community, the problem of discrimination be-
tween individuals. Because discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality concerns virtually everybody, this is a sensitive and uni-
versal concern. In addition, this Essay examines an area of law
in which the applicable law hinges upon the distinction between
the terms "at home" and "abroad." I use the expression distinc-
tion because not every distinction results in discrimination. Dis-
crimination occurs when a distinction is made between people
in comparable situations without sufficient justification.
The Treaty Establishing the European Community1 ("EC
Treaty") does not specifically empower the European Commu-
nity to legislate in the field of direct taxes. This does not mean,
however, that the internal law of Member States can disregard
the four freedoms 2 enshrined in the EC Treaty in the field of
taxation. While the Council has the power to issue directives for
the approximation of tax law under certain conditions, it has not
seen fit to do so. Consequently, the individual freedom of peo-
ple may conflict with the power of Member States to levy taxes
upon persons and business activities within the scope of their
authority, and, therefore, internal and international tax law must
* Carl Otto Lenz is an Advocate General at the European Court of Justice. The
author gratefully acknowledges David Southern for his translation of this Essay.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, (1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Singel European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987).
2. The four freedoms are the free movement of goods, EC Treaty, supra note 2,
arts. 9-37, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594-606; free movement of persons, id. arts. 48-58,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-16; free movement of services, id. arts. 59-66, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 616-18; and free movement of capital, id. arts. 67-73h, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
618-23.
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be brought into harm6ny with Community laws. Meanwhile, the
European Court of Justice ("Court") cannot just sit still and re-
spond passively to this development. The Court must ensure
that the freedoms guaranteed under the EC Treaty may be exer-
cised without discrimination. Simultaneously, the Court must
protect the sovereign rights of the Member States without the
guidance of special legislation applicable to the sector. Thus, it
is a classic dilemma: whatever the Court does will be criticized
for not protecting individual liberty, for not respecting the au-
thority of the Member States, or for failing to act at all. In the
Finanzamt Koln - Alstadt v. Roland Schumacker' decision and suc-
ceeding cases, the Court has attempted to consider international
tax law by confirming, for the first time, the distinction between
residents and non-residents as it is recognized in tax law. To do
justice to the special features of this case and the legal reasoning
it introduces, it is necessary first to consider the situation prevail-
ing before the Schumacker judgment.
I. JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE THE SCHUMACKER JUDGMENT
A. The Avoir Fiscal Judgment (1986): Freedom of Establishment
The Court's firstjudgment in the field of direct taxes dates
from January 1986 and resulted from an enforcement action of
the Commission against France, the Avoir Fiscal case.4 This case
touches on significant problems and principles, which are of im-
portance for the subsequent cases in the area of direct taxes.
The Avoir Fiscal case concerned the freedom of establishment
under Article 52 of the EC Treaty. 5 Article 52 "ensure [s] that all
nationals of Member States who establish themselves in another
Member State, even if that establishment is only secondary, for
the purpose of pursuing activities there as a self-employed per-
son receive the same treatment as nationals of that State .... "6
In addition, "it prohibits, as a restriction on freedom of establish-
ment, any discrimination on grounds of nationality resulting
from the legislation of the Member State."7 The Court found,
3. Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-225.
4. Commission v. France, Case 270/83, [1986] E.C.R. 273 [hereinafter Avoir Fis-
cal].
5. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14.
6. Avoir Fiscal, [1986] E.C.R. at 303, 1 14.
7. Id.
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"Article 52 expressly leaves traders free to choose the appropri-
ate legal form in which to pursue their activities in another
Member State .. . ."8
The Court's method of examination in this case has been
used in all subsequent cases dealing with direct taxation.9
Under this method, the Court considers whether or not there
has been a violation of Article 52. Such a breach may result both
from discrimination on the grounds of nationality and from a
restriction on the freedom of establishment. If a violation is
found to exist, the Court examines whether such a violation
could be justified in certain circumstances.
As far as the first stage of the examination is concerned, the
question regarding a violation of Article 52, the Court in the
Avoir Fiscal case pointed to tax law's distinction between resi-
dents and non-residents, 10 which plays a very important role in
the more recent direct tax cases. The circumstance that resi-
dents and non-residents may not be in a comparable situation,
however, is only regarded as a possibility, but by no means as the
only possibility, which may not be completely excluded." The
Court added that in the case of companies, their registered of-
fice is comparable with the nationality of natural persons' 2 be-
cause they both serve as the connecting factor with the legal sys-
tem of a particular Member State. The freedom of establish-
ment would be undermined if a Member State in which a
company seeks to establish itself may treat this company differ-
ently solely because the company's registered office is situated in
another Member State.' 3 The Court decided, therefore, that
rules in the field of direct taxation could contravene Article 52
and that such a violation could not be justified by inadequate
harmonization or inconsistent rules in double-taxation conven-
tions.
8. Id. at 305, 1 22. The Court added that the freedom to choose the appropriate
legal forum must not be "limited by discriminatory tax provisions." Id.
9. Id. at 302-07, 11-28.
10. AvoirFiscal, [1986] E.C.R. at 303-04, [[ 16-17.
11. Id. at 304, [ 19.
12. Id. at 304, 18.
13. Id.
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B. The Biehl Judgment (1990): Freedom of Movement for Workers
and Covert Forms of Discrimination
The Court in Klaus Biehl v. Administration des contributions du
grand-duche de Luxembourg4 extended the jurisprudence of the
Avior Fiscal case into the area of workers' freedom of movement
under Article 48 of the EC Treaty.15 Article 48 provides that the
"freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition of all
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the
Member States, particularly with regard to remuneration."' 6
The Court examined a Luxembourg regulation which pro-
hibited a repayment of tax in the event of over-payment if the
taxpayer had been a resident for only part of the year.' 7 The
rule, as such, did not expressly take nationality into account.
The Court, however, referred to its case-law, which stated that
the rules on equal treatment forbid both overt and covert forms
of discrimination. 8 As the Court further explained, the crite-
rion of permanent residence in the national territory carries
with it the risk that it "will work in particular against taxpayers
who are nationals of other Member States" because "[i] t is often
such persons who will in the course of the year leave the country
.... -"9 The Court, therefore, found that discrimination in the
Biehl case.
C. The Bachmann Judgment (1992): Fiscal Cohesion as a Ground
of Justification
The Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgium"° judgment also re-
quires consideration (The Court issued another judgment on
14. Case C-175/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1779.
15. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1791, 6. The Luxembourg regulation states:
Amounts duly deducted from capital incomes shall become the property of
the Treasury and are not repayable. The same shall apply to the deduction of
tax from the salaries and wages of taxpayers resident during only part of the
year because they take up residence in the country or leave it during the
course of the year.
Id. (quoting loi sur I'impot sur le revenu, art. 154(6)).
18. Behl, [1990] E.C.R. at 1792, 13 (citing Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case
152/73, [1974] E.C.R. 153, 1 11).
19. Id. at 1793, 14.
20. Case C-204/90, (1992] E.C.R. 1-249.
1997]
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the same day concerning the same legal regulation 21). The
question in Bachmann was whether contributions to insurance
companies of other Member States were deductible. The judg-
ment is important because the Court upheld the concept of fis-
cal cohesion as a ground of justification notwithstanding other
possible grounds of justification.22
The disputed Belgian regulation connected the deductibil-
ity of sickness and invalidity insurance contributions or pension
and life assurance contributions with the tax liability of sums pay-
able by the insurers under such assurance contracts.23 There was
concern regarding how such taxation could be guaranteed if the
payments are subsequently paid out in another Member State.
In the absence of a bilateral convention or a harmonization mea-
sure of the Council, the Court concluded, "as Community law
stands at present, it is not possible to ensure the cohesion of
such a tax system by means of measures which are less restrictive
than those at issue in the main proceedings .... ,,4 In the frame-
work of the Bachmannjudgment, the Court also considered, but
rejected, consumer protection as a justification for the discrimi-
nation. 5
Finally, the effectiveness of fiscal controls as a ground ofjus-
tification requires consideration. In the Bachmann judgment, as
well as in subsequent cases, the Court rejected such a justifica-
tion. The Court observed that Member States may invoke Coun-
cil Directive 77/799 of December 19, 197726 concerning mutual
assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in
the field of direct taxation to verify that payments have been
made in another Member State. 7
21. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-300/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-305.
22. Bachmann, [1992] E.C.R. at 283-84, 27-28.
23. Id. at 283, 27. The Belgian regulation "provide[d] that only voluntary sick-
ness and invalidity insurance contributions paid to a mutual insurance company recog-
nized by Belgium and pension and life insurance contributions paid in Belgium may be
deducted from occupational income." Id.
24. Bachmann, [1992] E.C.R. at 283, 27.
25. Id. at 281, 1 16.
26. Council Directive No. 77/799, OJ. L 336/15 (1977).
27. Bachmann, [1992] E.C.R. at 281, 1 18.
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D. The Werner Judgment (1993): Discrimination Within the Same
Group of Nationals
In Hans Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt,28 a German
national appealed the decision of the German tax authority that
found him subject to limited taxation. The Court decided that
there was no contravention of Article 52 of the EC Treaty when a
Member State imposed a heavier tax burden "on its nationals
who carry on their professional activities within its territory and
who earn all or almost all of their income there or possess all or
almost all of their assets there a heavier tax burden if they do not
reside in the state than if they do."2 9 Thus, the Court considered
this discrimination within the same group of nationals for which
the Community was not held responsible although the taxpayer
was a resident abroad.
II. THE SCHUMACKER JUDGMENT (1995)
In the previous judgments, the Court examined whether or
not there was discriminatory treatment on the basis of national-
ity or, in the case of covert disrimination, on the basis of resi-
dence and whether there were circumstances in which this could
be justified. The Schumacker ° judgment rounded off this ap-
proach in many ways. This case concerned the taxation of a Bel-
gian national, whose income derived from employment in Ger-
many.31 Lacking a permanent residence in Germany, the Bel-
gian national was classified as being subject to limited taxation."2
In Germany, for married couples, the so-called splitting-regime
had been "introduced to mitigate the progressive nature of the
income tax rates. "3 Pursuant to Germany's so called splitting
regime, which is applied under unlimited taxation, the income
of each spouse is combined, apportioned equally between the
28. Case C-112/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-429. By way of concluding my observations on
the decisions of the Court prior to the Schumackerjudgment, I would like to consider
this decision which falls somewhat outside the scope of my reflections up to this point,
but which will be of importance in relation to the later decisions.
29. Id. at 470, 1 17.
30. Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-225.
31. Id. at 254-55, 1 15-17.
32. Id. at 252, 5. Pursuant to "Paragraph 1(4) of the Einkommensteuergesetz
natural persons with no permanent residence or usual abode in Germany are subject to
tax only on the part of their income arising in Germany ('limited taxation')." Id.
33. Id. at 253, 1 7. The "splitting-regime" is located in paragraph 26b of the
Einkommensteuergesetz, the German law on income taxation.
19971
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two spouses, and then taxed according to the apportionment.3 4
The Court noted, "[i]f the income of one spouse is high and
that of the other low, 'splitting' makes their taxable amounts the
same and palliates the progressive nature of the income tax
rates." 35 Additionally, persons subject to unlimited taxation"
have available to them annual adjustments of wage tax to recover
over payments of tax.37 Moreover, "in the case of persons sub-
ject to unlimited taxation, tax is assessed according to overall
ability to pay, that is to say having regard to all the other income
received by such taxpayers and to their personal and family cir-
cumstances."3 8 In comparison, the German Government with-
holds these benefits from those employed persons who are sub-
ject to limited taxation.3 9
In the Schumacker case, Mr. Schumacker, a Belgian national
who had always lived in Belgium and been employed in Ger-
many, was subject to German taxation and was treated as a single
person for purposes of tax-splitting because he was classified as
being subject to limited taxation.40 He appealed this treatment.
The second stage of his appeal went to the Bundesfinanzhof, Fed-
eral Tax Court, which requested a number of preliminary rul-
ings from the European Court of Justice.4" The first question
concerned the powers of the Community in the field of direct
taxation. The Bundesfinanzhof asked whether Article 48 of the
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 252, 4. According to Paragraph 1(1) of the Einkommensteuergesetz,
.natural persons who have their permanent residence or usual abode in Germany are
subject there to tax on all their income", i.e., they are subject to unlimited taxation. Id.
37. Id. at 253, 1 9. Paragraph 46 of the Einkommensteuergesetz grants this proce-
dure. Id.
38. Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. at 253, 10. Personal and family circumstances in-
clude, "family expenses, welfare expenses and other outgoings which in general give
rise to tax relief and rebates." Id.
39. Id. at 254, 1 11.
40. Id. at 255, 17 17-18.
41. Id. at 255-56, 19. A preliminary ruling is a procedure employed by European
courts to ensure that "Community law will remain uniform in all Member States." Carl
Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18 Fo~RDHam INT'L
L.J. 388, 391 (1994). The process allows national courts to:
refer questions on the interpretation and validity of Community law to the
Court ofJustice for a binding determination. If a question of Community law
needs to be answered in order to determine a case before a court of last in-
stance, that court is obliged to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling.
Id. at 390.
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EC Treaty has the effect of limiting the right of Member States,
in this case the German Federal Republic, to establish the condi-
tions concerning the tax liability of a national of another Mem-
ber State and the manner of levying tax on the income received
by that national within its territory.4 In response to this, the
Court determined, "[a]lthough, as Community law stands at
present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview
of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States
must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community
law."4
3
The Court decided by reference to the earlier Biehljudg-
ment:
Article 48 of the [EC] Treaty must be interpreted as being
capable of limiting the right of a Member State to lay down
conditions concerning the liability to taxation and the man-
ner in which tax is to be levied on the income received within
its territory, since that article does not allow a Member State,
as regards the collection of direct taxes, to treat a national of
another Member State in the exercise of his right of freedom
of movement less favourably than one of its own nationals in
the same situation.44
In determining whether there may have been discrimination,
the Court, for the first time in the field of direct taxes, referred
to a well-established doctrine. That doctrine states, "discrimina-
tion can arise only through the application of different rules to
comparable situations or the application of the same rule to dif-
ferent situations."4' The Court then applied a new approach
stating, "[i]n relation to direct taxes the situations of residents
and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable." 46 Only in
the AvoirFiscaljudgment had the Court considered the possibil-
ity that residents and non-residents could be treated differently
because they were not in comparable situations. 47 In subsequent
judgments, there has been no further discussion of this question.
When the Court stated in Schumacker that residents and non-resi-
42. Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. at 255-56, 19.
43. Id. at 257, 1 21 (citing Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-246/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-4585, 12).
44. Id. at 258, 24.
45. Id. at 259, 30.
46. Id. at 260, 31.
47. AvoirFiscal, [1986] E.C.R. at 304, 19.
1997]
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dents are as a rule not in comparable situations, it overtook the
normal distinction drawn on the basis of residence in tax law.
This could imply that the Court is attempting to integrate inter-
national tax law principles with the Community law prohibition
of discimination.
In international tax law, the distinction is drawn between
taxation based on residence and source taxation. Taxation
based on residence concerns cases of unlimited taxability and
includes the taxpayer's worldwide income. It is applied to resi-
dent taxpayers taking into account their personal circumstances.
By contrast, source taxation is applied to non-residents. In other
words, taxation based on residence is made by reference to the
taxpayer's personal characteristics, foremost his personal ability
to pay tax, whereas source taxation is based on the fact that in-
come is obtained in a particular state. Unlike the state of resi-
dence, the source state may not refer to the taxpayer's personal
circumstances and his ability to pay tax.
The Court referred to these principles in the Schumacker
judgment.48 The Court explained that the total income is con-
centrated at the place of residence of the taxpayer and that the
non-resident's personal ability to pay tax, which is determined by
reference to his aggregate income and his personal circum-
stances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and
financial interests are centered.49 In general, that is the place
where the taxpayer has his usual abode. Examining interna-
tional tax law and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") Model Double Taxation Treaty,5'
the Court stated, "the overall taxation of taxpayers, taking ac-
count of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for
the state of residence."5' The major part of a resident's income
is normally concentrated in the state of residence, which has all
the information needed to assess the taxpayer's overall ability to
pay, including personal and family circumstances. 52
If the Court proceeds from the assumption that residents
48. Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. at 257-67, 20-59.
49. Id. at 260, 32.
50. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Comm. on Fiscal
Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (1977) [hereinaf-
ter 1977 OECD Treaty].
51. Schumacher, [1995] E.C.R. at 260, 32.
52. Id. at 260, 33.
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and non-residents are not in a comparable situation, there will
be no discrimination if a Member State denies certain tax privi-
leges to a non-resident which it grants to a resident. This consti-
tutes a limitation on the prohibition of discrimination.
The Court must ascertain, however, in every particular case,
whether or not residents and non-residents are genuinely in a
different situation. According to the reasoning of the Court in
the Schumacker case, this will not be the case where the non-resi-
dent receives no significant income in the Member State of his
residence "with the result that the State of residence is not in a
position to grant him the benefits resulting from the taking into
account of his personal and family circumstances.""3 A non-resi-
dent who essentially earns his taxable income from work in the
Member State where he is employed and whose income in the
Member State of residence is too small to absorb the tax benefits
which are due to him on the basis of his personal and family
circumstances finds himself in a similar situation with a resident
engaged in comparable employment. In other words, there is
no objective difference which could justify a different treat-
ment.54 The discrimination against Mr. Schumacker arises from
the fact that neither the Member State of residence nor the
Member State of employment could take into account his per-
sonal and family circumstances. 5
According to the standard method of examination the ques-
tion is then asked, whether this discrimination may be justified.
Once again, the question of cohesion of tax rules is raised, which
in the Bachmann judgment was recognized as a factor providing
justification.56 In the Schumacker case, it was submitted that there
was a link between the taking into account of the personal and
family circumstances and the right to tax worldwide income.57
The taking into account of personal circumstances is the matter
for the Member State of residence, which alone is entitled to tax
worldwide income.58 The Member State, on whose territory the
53. Id. at 261, 36.
54. Id. at 261, 37.
55. Id. at 261, 38.
56. See Bachmann, [1992] E.C.R. at 283-84, 128 (holding "in the field of pensions
and life insurance, provisions such as those contained in the Belgian legislation at issue
are justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system... ').
57. Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. at 261-62, 40.
58. Id.
1997]
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non-resident works, does not have to take account of his per-
sonal circumstances. In the Schumacker case, the Court did not
find ajustification on the basis of the fiscal cohesion. The Mem-
ber State of residence cannot take account of the taxpayer's per-
sonal situation because the tax payable there is insufficient to
enable it to do so.59 The Court posited, "[w]here that is the
case, the Community principle of equal treatment requires that,
in the [Member] State of employment, the personal and family
circumstances of a foreign non-resident be taken into account in
the same way as those of resident nationals and that the same tax
benefits should be granted to him."6" The denial of the advan-
tage of tax-splitting for married couples in the case of a non-
resident accordingly contravenes Article 48, because the person
concerned "obtains his income entirely or almost exclusively
from the work performed in the [other Member] State and does
not receive in the [State of residence] sufficient income to be
subject to taxation there in a manner enabling his personal and
family circumstances to be taken into account."61
This is the first case in which the Court considered the per-
sonal circumstances which must be taken into account in impos-
ing taxation in the Member State of residence. If this is not pos-
sible in the Member State of residence, then it must at least be
undertaken in the Member State in which the income is ob-
tained. In a given case, this leads to a situation in which the tax
relief a Member State grants to residents on the basis of personal
circumstances must also be applied to non-residents.
After the examination of material discrimination, the Court
considered discrimination at the procedural level and found it
to be present, in the form of the denial of the annual adjustment
of wages tax, as the consideration of special circumstances is only
compulsorily required for residents.62
59. Id. at 263, 47.
60. Id. at 262, 1 41.
61. Id. at 263, 47.
62. Id. at 264-66, 49-58. It seems that the German Government has transposed
the Schumackerjudgment into German tax law in the Jahressteuergesetz of 1996.
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III. JURISPRUDENCE AFTER THE SCHUMACKER JUDGMENT
A. The Wielockx Judgment (1995): The Question of Fiscal Cohesion
as a Problem of Bilateral Conventions
In 1995, the Court transferred the Schumacker doctrine to
the situation of the self-employed in G.H.E.J. Welockx v. Inspecteur
der Directe Belastingen.63 For the self-employed, Article 52 of the
EC Treaty lays out the freedom of establishment and provides
the norm. 4
Mr. Wielockx, a Belgian national resident in Belgium,
worked in the Netherlands as a physiotherapist and received his
entire income there. He was also liable to pay tax in the Nether-
lands. In the absence of a place of residence in the Netherlands,
he was regarded as a foreign taxpayer. Under Dutch law, a vol-
untary pension-reserve tax scheme for self-employed persons
had been established.65 Under that scheme, part of the profits
of a business could be allocated to form a pension reserve, the
amounts set aside each year remaining in the business. This
pension reserve is to be liquidated when the taxpayer reaches
the age of 65. The Netherlands Government then treats it as
income and taxes it either on the total capital or when periodic
payments are made from that capital. 66 Contrary to the position
which applied to national taxpayers, this pension reserve could
not be deducted from the taxable income.
The OECD Model Double Taxation Treaty provides that
"pensions and other similar remuneration paid to a resident of
Contracting State in consideration of past employment, shall be
taxable only in that State."67 There was a double taxation con-
vention between the Netherlands and Belgium.68
Based on the Schumackrjudgment, the Court decided that a
non-resident taxpayer who receives all of his income in the Mem-
ber State "where he works but who is not entitled to set up a
pension reserve qualifying for deductions under the same tax
conditions as a resident taxpayer suffers discrimination."69
63. Case C-80/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2493.
64. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14.
65. Wet op de Inkomstenbelasting of 16 November 1972 (Staatsblad 612), art.
44d(1).
66. Id., art. 44f(1)(e).
67. OECD Treaty, supra note 51, art. 18.
68. Tradatenblad, 1970, no. 192, art. 14(1).
69. Welockx, [1995] E.C.R. at 2516, 22.
1997] 649
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Of great importance in Wielockx is the subsequent examina-
tion of the justification for tax discrimination. Here, the Court
scrutinized the principle of fiscal cohesion which it considered
in Bachmann.7 ° The Netherlands Government submitted that a
correlation existed between the sums which are deducted from
the taxable income and the sums which are subject to tax. 71 If a
non-resident could set up a pension reserve in the Netherlands
and, thus, secure a right to a pension, that pension would not be
taxed in the Netherlands by virtue of the double-taxation con-
vention between Belgium and the Netherlands, as such income
is taxed in the State of residence, in this case in Belgium.72
In examining the question of cohesion, the Court went into
the problem of double-taxation conventions. It stated that on
the basis of double-taxation conventions, which follow the
OECD model, a " I s] tate taxes all pensions received by residents
in its territory, whatever the State in which the contributions
were paid .... ',T Conversely, it "waives the right to tax pensions
received abroad even if they derive from contributions paid in its
territory which it treated as deductible."74 The Court regarded
fiscal cohesion as established not only in relation to one and the
same person, but also on the level "of the reciprocity of the rules
applicable in the Contracting States",75 i.e., on the level of the
bilateral conventions. As the Court further explained, in a case
where fiscal cohesion is secured at the level of bilateral conven-
tion, that principle may not be invoked, in order to justify the
disadvantageous treatment of a foreign taxpayer.7" The possibil-
ity of justifying discrimination on the basis of the principle of
fiscal cohesion is, thereby, notably restricted.
In a further judgment of 1995, Peter Svensson v. Ministre du
Logement et de I'Urbanisme,77 the possibility ofjustification by refer-
ence to the fiscal cohesion was further restricted at the level of
the individual person. The problem in Svensson related to inter-
est rate subsidies in regard to housing construction, which were
70. See Bachmann, [1992] E.C.R. at 282-84, 7 20-28; Welockx, [1995] E.C.R. at
2516-17, It 2--27.
71. Wielockx, [1995] E.C.R. 2516, 23.
72. Id.




77. Case C-484/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3955.
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only granted to persons who had taken out a loan from a credit
institution approved in Luxembourg. 78 The Government of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg submitted that the policy of sup-
porting housing construction would be a failure without the con-
tested rule, as a large portion of the interest rate subsidies paid
out are recovered through a profit tax on financial establish-
ments.79 The Court did not allow pursuit of this objective be-
cause there was no direct link "between the grant of the interest
rate subsidy to borrowers on the one hand and its financing by
means of the profit tax on financial establishments on the
other."0 Moreover, economic aims could not be called up to
provide a justification on the grounds of the general interest.8'
B. The Asscher Judgment (1996): Economic Activity in Several
Member States
The last case to be considered refers to the argument
adopted in the Schumacker and Wielockx judgments prohibiting
that personal circumstances not be taken into account in the
state of employment where a taxpayer obtains his income almost
exclusively but is not a resident. Accordingly, the taxpayer's per-
sonal circumstances must be taken into account in the state
where he is a non-resident but obtains his income.8 2 This doc-
trine has been much discussed and, in part, criticized." On the
one hand, it is regarded as problematic to exclude from this
treatment someone who does not obtain his whole income in
another Member State. This would mean that a taxpayer, who
obtained his income in a number of Member States, could be
treated less favorably in terms of taxation than a resident. On
the other hand, the question is raised as to how the formulation
"almost all of his worldwide income" can be defined and
whether it could be fixed at a certain percentage. The Asscher v.
78. Id. at 3973,75, 2-9. These restrictions were imposed pursuant to Article
1(3) of the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 17June 1991. Id. at 3973, 3.
79. Svensson, [1995] E.C.R. at 3976, 13.
80. Id. at 3977, 18.
81. Id. at 3976-77, 1 15.
82. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (stating that Mr. Schumacker's
discrimination resulted from fact that neither Member State of residence nor employ-
ment could take into account his personal and family circumstances).
83. PeterJ. Wattel, The EC Court's attempts to reconcile the treaty freedoms with interna-
tional tax law, [1996] C.M.L.R. 33 at 223.
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Staatssecretaris va Financien84 judgment of 1996 addresses these
problems.
Mr. Asscher, a Dutch national resident in Belgium, pursued
a self-employed activity both in the Netherlands and in Belgium.
Under Dutch law, a non-resident taxpayer can only be accorded
equivalent status to a resident taxpayer, if he shows that all or
almost all, that is to say at least ninety percent, of his worldwide
income is taxable in the Netherlands.8" This did not apply to
Mr. Asscher, who was, therefore, subject to a higher rate of tax.
The Court repeated the formulation it used in Schumacker.16 It
added that, where a non-resident taxpayer does not receive all or
almost all of his income in the Member State in which he works
but does not reside, he can be denied benefits in the Member
State of employment if a comparable benefit is granted in the
Member State of residence.87
The Netherlands Government had submitted that it in-
tended the higher rate of tax to offset the fact that certain non-
residents escape the progressive nature of the tax. The Court
referred in this regard to the Convention for the avoidance of
double taxation between Belgium and the Netherlands and to
the OECD Model Convention, which provided that income re-
ceived in a state in which the taxpayer pursues an economic ac-
tivity but does not reside is taxable exclusively in that state and
exempt in the state of residence.88 In this connection, however,
in order to apply the rule of progressivity, inter alia, it is impor-
tant that the Member State of residence remains entitled to take
into account such income in calculating the amount of tax on
the remaining income. Consequently, a non-resident would not
escape the application of the rule of progressivity in the case
under consideration and would be in a situation comparable to
that of a resident. On this basis, the Court found that there was
indirect discrimination.89
84. Case C-107/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3089.
85. This condition is deemed to be fulfilled if the taxpayer is subject in the Nether-
lands to contributions under the national compulsory social insurance scheme.
86. Schumacker, [1995] E.C.R. at 261, 37.
87. Asscher, [1996] E.C.R. at 3126, 44.
88. Id. at 3126, 46-47; Article 24(2)(1) of the Convention of 19 October 1970
between Belgium and the Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation of income
and property and for the regulation of certain other taxation matters (Tractatenbiad
1970, no. 192); OECD Treaty, supra note 51, arts. 23A(1), 23A(3).
89. Asscher, [1996] E.C.R. at 3126, 1 47-48.
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The Court did not limit itself to the application of the crite-
rion of whether the whole income is obtained in a Member State
which is not the Member State of residence, but instead consid-
ered also with regard to bilateral conventions, whether, in the
particular case, residents and non-residents were in a compara-
ble situation.
As far as the justification of this discrimination was con-
cerned, the Netherlands Government had submitted that the ab-
olition of the right to deduct social security contributions has
entailed for residents an increase in taxable income and, con-
comitantly, in the amount of tax payable. This would have led to
a disadvantaging of residents in the absence of a higher taxation
of non-residents.9 0 The Court did not accept this submission. In
the particular case in which Mr. Asscher is properly insured with
the Belgian social security scheme, there can be no question of
penalizing him by means of a tax differential for not paying so-
cial security contributions in the Netherlands.9 '
Finally, the Court once more raised the question of fiscal
cohesion.92 The Court rejected a justification by pointing out
that there was no direct link between the application of a higher
rate of tax and the fact no social security contributions were lev-
ied on the income earned in the Netherlands.93 The application
of a higher rate of tax did not provide any social security protec-
tion. In addition, the non-participation in the Netherlands so-
cial security system derives from the application of the corre-
sponding Community law, which the Member States had to ob-
serve. In other words, the Member States are not entitled to
determine the extent to which their own legislation is applicable.
They were, therefore, also not entitled to use tax measures to
make up for the fact that a taxpayer is not insured with and does
not pay contributions to its social security scheme.'
Asscher also raises the question of how far a national may
complain against his own tax administration of inequality of
treatment as compared with the treatment of residents. The
Court conceded that the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to
freedom of establishment may not be applied to situations which
90. Id. at 3127, 51.
91. Id. at 3128, 1 54.
92. Id. at 3128, 55.
93. Id. at 3129, 59.
94. Id. at 3129-30, 11 59-61.
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are purely internal to a Member State. Nevertheless, the Court
explained that it is settled law that Article 52 may not be inter-
preted in such a way as to exclude a given Member State's own
nationals from the benefit of Community law where by reason of
their conduct they are, with regard to their Member State of ori-
gin, in an equivalent situation to that of any other person en-
joying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the EC Treaty.95
For this reason, Mr. Asscher may, as a Netherlands national,
complain to the Netherlands authorities about discrimination
which he suffers as a non-resident.96
CONCLUSION
As appears, in particular from the Asscherjudgment, it will
be necessary in the future to ask in every individual case whether
non-residents and residents find themselves in a comparable sit-
uation. In this process, it will also be necessary to take account
of bilateral double-taxation conventions. As far as the area of
double-taxation conventions is concerned, the problem has
been discussed whether a bilateral treaty granting advantages to
only one Member State must be applied to all other Member
States or whether a favorable treaty rule with a third state must
also be applied to Member States. The Court has so far not been
confronted with this problem, and I, accordingly, do not wish to
consider it further. It remains to be seen whether or not the
Court will be confronted with this problem in the future. Fur-
ther questions about the unequal treatment in the taxation of
natural and legal persons may be expected with certainty. For
example, the Court had to decide whether the carrying forward
of losses may be made subject to the condition that accounts
should be duly made up and kept within the Member State of
the company's residence by a permanent establishment of a for-
eign company or whether this constitutes a limitation on the
freedom of establishment. The Court decided that the Member
State may require the non-resident taxpayer to demonstrate
clearly and precisely that the amount of the losses which he
claims to have incurred corresponds to the amount of the losses
actually incurred in that Member State by the taxpayer. Article
52 of the EC Treaty precludes, however, the carrying forward of
95. Id. at 3122, 1 32.
96. Id.
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losses from being made subject to the condition that the tax-
payer must have kept and held in that Member State accounts
relating to his activities carried on there which comply with the
relevant national rules, because such a condition constitutes a
restriction on the freedom of establishment. 97
97. Futura Participations SA, Singer v. Administration des Contributions, Case C-
250/95.
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